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In conventional PKI, CAs are assumed to be fully trusted. However, in practice,
CAs’ absolute responsibility for providing trustworthiness caused major security
and privacy issues. To prevent such issues, Google introduced the concept of
Certificate Transparency (CT) in 2013. Later, several new PKI models (e.g.,
AKI, ARPKI, and DTKI) are proposed to reduce the level of trust to the
CAs. However, all of these proposals are still vulnerable to split-world attacks
if the adversary is capable of showing different views of the log to the targeted
victims. In this paper, we propose a new PKI architecture with certificate
transparency based on blockchain, what we called CertLedger, to eliminate the
split-world attacks and to provide an ideal certificate/revocation transparency.
All TLS certificates, their revocation status, entire revocation process, and
trusted CA management are conducted in the CertLedger. CertLedger provides
a unique, efficient, and trustworthy certificate validation process eliminating
the conventional inadequate and incompatible certificate validation processes
implemented by different software vendors. TLS clients in the CertLedger also
do not require to make certificate validation and store the trusted CA certificates
anymore. We analyze the security and performance of the CertLedger and provide
a comparison with the previous proposals.
Keywords: PKI; SSL/TLS; Certificate Transparency; Certificate validation; Blockchain
1. INTRODUCTION
Web based applications such as internet banking,
mailing, e-commerce are playing a major role for
facilitating our life and became an indispensable
part of it. As a de facto standard, SSL/TLS
certificates are used to provide authenticity, integrity
and confidentiality services to these applications. These
certificates are issued by CAs which are assumed to be
trusted organizations in the conventional PKI systems.
In particular, CAs are expected to operate according
to some rules which are announced as Certificate
Policy (CP) and Certificate Practice Statement (CPS)
documents. In the current trust model, CAs have
the absolute responsibility to issue correct certificates
for the designated subject. However, CAs can still
be compromised and fake but valid certificates can
be issued due to inadequate security practices or
non-compliance with the CP and CPS. During the
last decade, there have been serious incidents due
to aforementioned reasons which we shortly mention
below.
• The Stuxnet [1] malware is signed by the private
keys of two compromised Taiwanese CAs which
targets to control a specific industrial system likely
in Iran, such as a gas pipeline or power plant.
• Comodo CA, which has a big share in SSL market
is hacked in March 2011 [2]. One of its Registration
Authority (RA) is attacked to issue 9 fraudelent
certificates where the attacker is traced back to
Iran.
• A Dutch CA DigiNotar is pawned in July
2011 [3]. 531 fraudulent certificates are issued
for valuable domains such as *.google.com,
*.windowsupdate.com and *.mozilla.com. These
certificates could easily be used to distribute
malicious Windows updates or Firefox plugins
without taking attention. At least 300.000 unique
IPs are detected using Google services through
these certificates, which 99% of the traffic is from
The Computer Journal, Vol. ??, No. ??, ????
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
03
91
4v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
 O
ct 
20
18
2 M. Y. Kubilay, M. S. Kiraz, and H. A. Mantar
Iran.
• Trustwave CA has sold a subCA certificate for
one of its subordinates. This subCA has issued
fraudelent TLS certificates which are used to
introspect TLS traffic [4].
• A Turkish CA Turktrust has mistakenly issued
subCA certificates instead of TLS certificates in
December 2012 [5]. These certificates are used to
generate TLS certificates for traffic introspection.
Google identified the fraudulent Google certificate
via Chrome.
• A subCA of the Chineese CA CNNIC, which is
located in Egypt, issued fraudulent TLS certificates
for traffic introspection in March 2015 [6]. Later
on, it is identified that CNNIC is operated without
documented CPS.
• Lenova Superfish has deployed local CA in its
products in 2015 [7]. This CA is used to inject
ads into the TLS protected web sites. Since the
CA private keys are in the computer RAM, they
may be easily used to introspect traffic.
• Symantec issued unauthorized certificates for
Google domains in September 2015 [8]. Later
on Symantec claimed that these certificates are
produced for test purposes.
• Symantec purchased Blue Coat in May 2016
[9]. Blue Coat has devices to snoop encrypted
internet traffic. Blue Coat became a SubCA
under Symantec. This unification increased the
skepticism.
These fatal incidents lead to many researches to
distribute the absolute trust on CAs to multiple
authorities. To detect fake but valid TLS certificates,
key pinning [10, 11], crowd sourcing [12–17] , pushing
revocation information to browsers [18,19] are the initial
solutions which are partly implemented but failed due
to scalability problems.
1.1. Related Work
We here briefly describe the previous attempts for
solving the issues described above in a chronological
order and point out their potential weaknesses.
1.1.1. Sovereign Key (SK) Cryptography
SK has been proposed by Eckersley in order to prevent
man-in-the-middle (MITM) and server impersonation
attacks against domains protected by TLS certificates
[20]. In SK, domains generate a sovereign asymmetric
key pair for a set of selected services such as https,
smtps, and imaps and publish public part of the key
in TimeLine Servers (T S) along with their domain
name. T S store entries in read and append only
data structures. During the TLS handshake, domains
generate a fake certificate by their sovereign key and
append to the certificate chain. If the clients cannot
verify the signature on this fake certificate with the
associated public key in T S, they refuse to make the
connection to the service. However, T S does not return
any verifiable proof to domains whether the sovereign
key is appended to the log [21]. Furthermore, another
unrealistic strong assumption of SK is that clients have
to trust not only the T S but also their Mirrors [21].
1.1.2. Certificate Transparency (CT)
CT is proposed by Google in 2013 and aims to
detect fake but valid certificates by providing append-
only, publicly auditable logs for all issued TLS
certificates, and shorten their lifetime [22]. CT
improves the SK ’s append-only log approach by
using append-only Merkle Hash Trees (MHT) for
appending and efficiently verifying TLS certificates
[23]. In this respect, CT introduces Certificate Logs
(CL), Monitors, and Auditors as new entities. CAs
submit the new TLS (pre)certificates to the CLs
which generates a cryptographic proof called Signed
Certificate Timestamp (SCT). After appending the
new certificates to the log, CL computes the Signed
Tree Head (STH) and generates Consistency Proof for
proving whether the new log is an extension of the
old one. Merkle Audit Proof shows the existence of
a certificate in the log. SCT can be delivered to
the TLS clients either as a certificate extension, or
in a TLS extension during TLS handshake, or in the
OCSP response. If the TLS clients do not receive
SCT by aforementioned-means or cannot verify them
using CL’s public key, they may refuse to connect to
the service. Domain owners or private companies can
act as Monitors and continually inspect certificates of
their interest in CL whether there exist illegitimate
certificates. Browsers, or in general TLS clients, act
as Auditors. They verify if a CL is behaving properly
and cryptographically consistent.
However, the authors in [24] show that if an adversary
can get a fake but valid TLS certificate and can control
the CL then he can perform an impersonation/MITM
attack to the targeted victims by providing a fraudulent
view of the log that contains the fake certificate. This
attack is later referred to as split-world attack [25] which
is elaborated as follows.
1. The adversary gets a fake but valid TLS certificate
for a domain from the CA.
2. The adversary or the CA submits this certificate
to the log.
3. The adversary obtains a bogus SCT for the fake
TLS certificate from the log. SCT is fake, since
the log maintains more than one hash trees. It
shows different views of the tree to different sets of
clients. Merkle Audit Proof and Consistency Proof
are generated from different hash trees and the
victim clients cannot understand that the proofs
are not generated from the genuine hash tree.
4. When a targeted victim client tries to connect to a
domain, the adversary controlling the traffic sends
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the fake certificate and the bogus SCT to the client.
5. Upon validation of the fake certificate and the SCT,
client connects to either the fake domain or the real
domain through a proxy.
Monitors cannot detect this attack since they get and
verify the Consistency Proof s only from the genuine
view of the log. Auditors (victim TLS Clients) cannot
detect the attack, since they can verify the existence of
the fake TLS certificate in the log with the fake STH and
the Merkle Audit Proof generated from the fraudulent
view of the log. The other Auditors also cannot detect
either, since they get STH and the proofs from only the
genuine view of the log.
As pointed out in RFC 6962 for CT [22], to detect the
attack in the existing CT architecture, there must be
sufficiently large number of clients and servers gossiping
their view of STHs with each other. Moreover, some of
the clients should also act as Auditors for checking the
consistency of the log. Some of these gossiping Auditors
should be able to receive both the genuine and the fake
proofs belonging to a log to figure out the inconsistency.
If an Auditor has two STHs with the same tree size but
with different values, this will be an evidence for the
misbehaviour of the log. If an Auditor has two different
STHs with unequal tree sizes then it can request the
Consistency Proof from the log. Since the log cannot
provide this proof it should be investigated for malicious
behaviour.
1.1.3. Certificate Issuance and Revocation Trans-
parency (CIRT)
CIRT focuses on extending CT to provide additional
proofs so that CAs can show their honest behaviour
[26]. Therefore, CIRT maintains two merkle trees
as public logs which are ordered chronologically and
lexicographically. In addition to CT ’s proofs, CIRT
provides proofs for whether a certificate is marked as
revoked in the log, whether a certificate is current(not
replaced and not revoked) and finally whether a
certificate is absent(has never been issued). However,
CIRT is also vulnerable to the split-world attacks [25]
as CT.
1.1.4. Accountable Key Infrastructure (AKI)
AKI proposes a new PKI architecture for reducing
the level of trust to the CAs where all the operations
defined in a conventional PKI are performed with
participation of more than one entity [27]. All entities
either monitor or report the operations performed by
other entities in order to distribute the accountability
among the participating entities. Certification Agency
(CA), Integrity Log Server (ILS) Operators (ILSO),
and Validators are the new entities introduced by
AKI. CAs still issue certificates to domains but
they are not the absolute authority for certificate
management anymore. ILSOs store not only the
certificates, but also their registration, update, and
revocation information lexicographically according to
domain names. Validators monitor ILS operations
and check whether they operate as expected. Domain
owners can select the CAs and the ILSOs they trust,
define the minimum number of recommended CA
signatures on a certificate and the rules for certificate
management. They register the certificate to one or
more ILS s. Domains send their certificates and the
verification information received from the ILS s to the
clients. Clients verify the certificates using preinstalled
trusted CA certificates and the ILS public keys.
However, AKI makes a strong assumption that the
trusted entities (CAs, ILS s, and Validators) do not
collude with each other which is unrealistic in case of a
strong adversary who is willing to intercept the traffic.
A compromised CA and an ILS is sufficient to generate
a fake certificate in AKI. The adversary gets proofs
from the compromised entities in order to send to the
TLS client. Taking this fact into consideration, it is
also possible to make a split-world attack to the AKI.
Unfortunately, there is no way of detecting this attack
in AKI.
Secondly, certificate revocation is a weak point in
AKI since the domain owner can request the certificate
revocation from an ILS without requiring confirmation
of any other parties. Namely, an adversary, which
has compromised the domain private key, can request
the revocation of the corresponding certificate without
further verification.
Finally, clients have to trust not only the CAs and the
ILS s but also the Validators in AKI which is a burden
for them in terms of trusted entity management.
1.1.5. Attack Resilient PKI (ARPKI)
ARPKI is an improvement of AKI, which offers
a security guarantee against adversaries which can
compromise even n − 1 trusted entities [28]. For
generating an ARPKI certificate (called ARCert), at
least two CAs and one ILS are required. For the initial
registration process, a domain owner selects the trusted
entities, at minimum two CAs and one ILS (i.e., CA1,
CA2, and ILS 1). The domain owner designates one
of the CAs (e.g., CA1) for validating CA2 and ILS 1
operations and serving as a messenger between these
entities and himself. ILS 1 takes the responsibility for
ensuring synchronization of ARCert among majority of
ILS s. Domains send the cryptographic proof signed
by three trusted entities along with the ARCert to the
clients. Upon verification of the proofs, clients connect
to the domain.
However, ARPKI is also subject to split-world attack
if it the entities required to generate an ARPKI
certificate collude together. There is also no detection
mechanism for this attack in ARPKI as AKI. Secondly,
designating an ILS for making synchronization with
other ILS s may lead to a single point of failure in
ARPKI.
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1.1.6. NameCoin and CertCoin
NameCoin is a cryptocurrency forked from Bitcoin [29],
which is designed to act as a decentralized DNS for
“.bit” adresses [30]. In NameCoin, self signed TLS
certificate of a domain can be added to the DNS
addresses as auxiliary information. TLS clients can
then authenticate the domain during TLS handshake
using this certificate.
Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure with Identity
Retention (Certcoin) proposes a decentralized PKI
architecture based on NameCoin where no CA exists
[31]. In Certcoin, the basic PKI operations are defined
such as registering an identity with a public key, looking
up, verifying, and revoking a public key for a given
identity. Identities register an online and an offline
key pair to themselves. Online key is used for domain
authentication whereas offline key is used to revoke old
online keys and to sign new online keys. However, in
both proposals (i.e., Namecoin and Certcoin), there is
no identity verification. Namely, whoever first claims
the ownership of an identity owns it. Consequently,
in real world, identities (in particular TLS clients)
can easily be deceived. Secondly, they have also no
adequate solution in case both online and offline keys
are compromised. Hence, the identity owners cannot
reclaim their identities securely which can lead to
unusable identities. Thirdly, since both proposals are
using the Bitcoin blockchain architecture, verifying the
owner of a public key, and looking up the public key
of an identity is extremely inefficient. In order to solve
these issues, Certcoin proposes extra entities which are
also maintained in the blockchain such as accumulators
and distributed hash tables. Since these entities
are not a part of the blockchain architecture, they
can cause new complexities in terms of maintenance,
authentication, and verification.
1.1.7. Distributed Transparent Key Infrastructure
(DTKI)
DTKI proposes a public log based certificate manage-
ment architecture which minimizes oligopoly, prevents
use of fake certificates, and claims being secure even if
all service providers collude all together [21]. Certificate
Log Maintainer (CLM) and Mapping Log Maintainer
(MLM) are the two new entities introduced by DTKI.
CLMs keep all valid, revoked and expired certificates
for a set of domains and provide proofs for existence
or absence of them. MLM maintains the association
between a set of domain names and the CLMs which
are maintaining the logs for them. Mirrors maintain
a full copy of the data stored by both the CLMs and
the MLM. CAs make identity checks and issue cer-
tificates, but they are not the sole entity for providing
trust to connect to a domain. Inspiring “soverign key”
concept in SK, a domain here owns two types of cer-
tificates, TLS certificate and a master certificate which
is used for requesting a new TLS certificate from the
CA, and registering it to the CLM. Users or in partic-
ular browsers first query theMLM in order to find the
correct CLM for a specific domain. To make a connec-
tion decision, first the proofs received from the MLM
is verified, then CLM is queried in order to retrieve
proofs for the domain’s TLS certificate.
In DTKI, assumes all master certificates are genuine,
and fake master certificate issuance does not likely
occur since CAs are running businesses which cannot
afford loss of reputation. However, this is not a
valid argument since most of the fake certificates are
generated due to lack of adequate security controls
or processes. Namely, if the CA and the CLM are
both compromised, DTKI would not be able to prevent
fake Master and TLS certificate issuance. From this
perspective, the adversary who is controlling CLM and
capable of generating fake but valid Master and TLS
certificates can make split-world attack to the targeted
victims. This attack unfortunately cannot be detected
because there is no monitoring process in DTKI due to
the assumption of genuine master certificates.
1.1.8. Blockchain-based Certificate and Revocation
Transparency
Very recently in FC’18, Wang et al. proposed
a blockchain-based certificate and revocation trans-
parency to store the TLS certificates and their revo-
cation status (i.e., CRL and OCSP) [32]. Briefly in this
scheme, web servers publish their TLS certificates to
the blockchain using their publishing key pairs which
are used to sign the transactions. Note that these pub-
lishing key pairs are different from the key pair in the
certificate and are initially certified by a certain set of
web servers which already exist in the blockchain. In
this scheme, the transactions have a validity period,
therefore TLS certificates and their revocation status
are added to the blockchain periodically during their
lifetime. During a TLS handshake, a web server sends
a certificate transaction and its Merkle audit path to a
TLS client which verifies its validity through its locally
stored syncronized block headers.
However, this proposal has the following drawbacks.
• It has an unreliable basis for providing the
trustworthiness of publishing key pairs. Namely,
a strong adversary, who can get fake but valid
TLS certificates from corrupted CAs, can create
some bogus domains (i.e., web servers) in advance
and can use them to generate a valid signature of
a publishing key pair transaction. This problem
occurs due to the trust to the web servers. The
authors propose to solve this issue by having “more
publicly-trusted CA”s to invalidate the interfering
transactions. However, this introduces a trust level
issue which is not explicitly clarified.
• For the revocation transparency, it relies on the
CAs to publish the revocation data of the TLS
certificates on the blockchain. However, the
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compromised or malfunctioning CAs may not issue
CRL or give OCSP response to the client in the
specified time.
• It is subject to MITM attacks where an adversary
can convince a client with an unexpired transaction
of a revoked TLS certificate. More concretely,
during a TLS handshake, web servers send a
certificate transaction to a TLS client to validate
the TLS certificate. The TLS client accepts
this transaction if it is not expired and is added
to a confirmed block. However, a revoked
or updated TLS certificate can also have an
unexpired certificate transaction in the blockchain.
Therefore, once an adversary sends this unexpired
certificate transaction with its Merkle proofs to
a TLS client, it is accepted during the TLS
handshake. The TLS clients cannot detect the
final state of the certificate since the clients only
check the existence of the transaction in the
corresponding block.
• The proposal is also inefficient in terms of storage
costs due to following design considerations. 1)
A TLS certificate is added to the blockchain
periodically during its lifetime, 2) A CRL can be
added to the blockchain for each revoked certificate
(i.e., the number of CRL insertion to the blockchain
is equal to the number of revoked certificates), 3)
Publishing key pairs are added to the blockchain
periodically 4) It has large size headers which
comprise DNS names existing in the transactions
of the block.
1.2. Ongoing Security Issues
In the afore-mentioned public log based proposals, a
strong adversary who has the ability to control the
trusted entities (i.e., CA, Log Operator) can apply split-
world attacks by providing different views of the logs to
the targeted victims [24]. While some of these proposals
cannot detect this attack, others propose to use gossip
protocols to identify it by ensuring a consistent view of
the log for the TLS clients [25,33–35]. Still, this attack
can only be identified if 1) there are sufficient numbers
of gossiping TLS clients and servers, 2) at least some of
them are able to view the genuine log and request the
consistency proof from the log.
As also described in [36], certificate revocation and
validation processes have major problems in today’s
PKI. Namely, for the revocation process, certificate
owners have to rely on CAs which have the full
responsibility to revoke the certificates and give proper
revocation services. However, a compromised or
malfunctioning CA may not behave as expected.
Browsers would then accept revoked certificates
since they rarely check whether the certificates are
revoked [36]. Moreover, incompatible and inadequate
implementations of certificate validation and revocation
behavior within browsers are also error prone [36].
Another issue is the necessity of trusted key
management in TLS clients. TLS clients have to trust
CA certificates or some other trusted entities’ public
keys to make a successful TLS certificate validation. In
case of a compromise, removal of root certificates/keys
from all the clients’ trusted key stores brings burden
(e.g., due to IT policy restrictions, OS configuration,
network communication) and causes vulnerability (e.g.,
outdated OS or apps). Moreover, if an adversary can
inject a fake CA certificate to the trusted certificate
store of a client, he can easily perform MITM attack
without being detected [7, 37].
1.3. Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a new and efficient
PKI architecture, which we called CertLedger, to
make TLS certificates and their revocation status
transparent while eliminating the above-mentioned
issues. CertLedger uses a blockchain based public
log to validate, store, and revoke TLS certificates.
In summary, we make the following contributions in
CertLedger :
• Resistance to split-world attacks
• More transparent revocation process rather than
relying on CAs
• Unique, efficient, and trustworthy certificate
validation process
• Trusted key store elimination in the TLS clients
• Preserving the privacy of the TLS clients
• No external auditing requirement due to inherent
public log architecture
• Efficient and prompt monitoring to minimize the
attack duration
• Transparency in trusted CA management
We also provide a detailed security and performance
analysis of CertLedger and compare it with the most
recent works.
1.4. Roadmap
In Section 2, we describe how public blockchain solves
the afore-mentioned problems of PKI. In section 3,
we describe our proposal CertLedger which is a new
PKI model with certificate transparency based on
blockchain. We analyse CertLedger in terms of security
and performance in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. In
Section 6, we compare CertLedger with existing schemes
and finally conclude the paper with describing the
future work in Section 7.
2. HOW PUBLIC BLOCKCHAIN SOLVES
PKI PROBLEMS?
Blockchain is a shared, immutable, decentralized public
ledger comprising an ever growing list of blocks. A
block is a data structure which is comprised of a
header and a list of transactions. Each block is
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linked to the previous one with a cryptographic hash,
therefore blocks are inherently secured from tampering
and revision. Blockchain network is a decentralized
peer-to-peer (P2P) network composed of full nodes
and light nodes. Full nodes store a copy of the
blockchain, validate, and propagate new transactions
and blocks across the network while light nodes store
only block headers. All nodes can create transactions
to change the state of the blockchain. New blocks of the
transactions are collectively validated and appended to
the existing chain according to a distributed consensus
mechanism. There are several consensus mechanisms
used in blockchain networks, e.g., Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance algorithm (Practical BFT) [38] (which
is utilized in HyperLedger Fabric [39]), Delegated BFT
[40] (which is utilized in Neo [41]), Proof-of-Work
(PoW) (which is utilized in Bitcoin [29], Ethereum
[42]), Ripple [43] (which is utilized in Ripple [44]), and
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) [45] (which is utilized in Cardano
[46], PeerCoin [47]). From now on, for simplicity,
we we refer to ’blockchain’ as blockchain network.
In general there are also three types of Blockchain:
1) Permissionless (e.g., Bitcoin [29], Ethereum [42],
ZCash [48]), 2) Public Permissioned Blockchain (e.g.,
Ripple [43]), 3) Private Permissioned Blockchain. While
any peer can join and leave the network any time
in permissionless blockchains, permissioned blockchains
require authorization for the membership of the peers.
In the permissioned blockchains, if public verifiability
is required, then the transactions of the blockchain
must also be public. However, private permissioned
blockchains may be used for corporate networks which
have sensitive data.
In the following, we show why blockchain solves
1) Split-world attack, 2) Certificate revocation and
validation problems, and 3) Trusted certificate/key
store management problems.
1. As described in Section 1, existing proposals try to
solve the transparency issue in PKI by introducing
(one or more) public logs [21, 22, 27, 28]. However,
they are still subject to split-world attack due to
the trust to a log operator. In order to prevent
such an attack, the trust should be distributed
in such a way that a single log operator could
not be able to control the log itself. Therefore,
a decentralized public log mechanism is required
which is synchronously updated only upon a
consensus of its clients. Once the consensus is
achieved, the log should be updated and could
not be reverted anymore. We would also like
to highlight that, in order to prevent the split-
world attack, RFC 6962 for CT states [22], “All
clients should gossip with each other, exchanging
STHs at least; this is all that is required to
ensure that they all have a consistent view. The
exact mechanism for gossip will be described in a
separate document, but it is expected there will be a
variety”. Therefore, as also directly implied by “all
clients gossiping to each other”, blockchain is an
architecture fullfilling all these required features.
2. Certificate validation is a required process for
each TLS connection, and comprises trusted
path construction and revocation checking phases.
Currently, certificate validation burden is entirely
on browsers. However, if TLS certificates are
stored on a blockchain, trusted path construction
can be done only once while they are being
appended to the blockchain. Consequently,
browsers can trust the TLS certificates on the
blockchain without requiring further validation.
As also described in [36], browsers have different
implementations for revocation checking which
are error prone. By managing the revocation
status of TLS certificates in the blockchain,
revocation checking process can be simplified and
unified. Namely, revocation checking burden
using CRL and OCSP services can be eliminated.
Furthermore, while certificates can be revoked
only by CAs in the existing system, they
can also be revoked by their owners on the
blockchain. Since, the complete revocation process
is conducted through the blockchain it becomes
more transparent.
3. Validation of certificates while appending to the
blockchain also requires trusted CA certificates
to exist on the blockchain. Therefore, these
certificates have to be stored and managed on
the blockchain. Consequently, TLS clients do not
need to store trusted CA certificates anymore since
blockchain ensures to append the TLS certificates
issued only from the trusted CAs.
2.1. Blockchain Characteristics for PKI
Using the decision-sequence of Wu¨st and Gervais [49],
we now identify the type of blockchain to manage the
certificate log. Note that, a writer is an entity who is
able to accumulate new transactions into a new block
and append it to the blockchain.
1. Do you need to store state?
TLS certificates are being updated continually
due to expiration or revocation. The state of
the certificates have to be stored and updated
whenever necessary.
2. Are there multiple writers?
TLS certificates generated by the trusted CAs
are appended to the log. A manipulated single
writer can append fake but valid certificates to
the log, delay or ignore appending the genuine
ones. Therefore, increasing decentralization
while writing to the log will reduce the risk
of manipulation due to the fact that broad
participation of writers will lead to a more reliable
and robust log.
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3. Can you use an always online Trusted Third Party
(TTP)?
As described in Section 1, a strong adversary can
control any TTP which can lead to a single point
of failure. An online TTP assumption is the main
source of vulnerability.
4. Are all writers known?
The writers may be known or unknown. However,
if they are known, they should be selected and
dispersed all over the world in such a way that their
malicious cooperation and manipulation could not
be possible.
5. Are all writers trusted?
Even though, all the writers are seemingly trusted,
some of them can be controlled by a strong
adversary.
6. Is public verifiability required?
The existence and validity status of all TLS
certificates must be verifiable by public for ultimate
transparency.
Thus, the decision flowchart results in either a
permissionless or a public permissioned blockchain for
managing the certificate logs. However, the blockchain
requires the following additional features. First of
all, it must comprise smart contract infrastructure to
implement the required rules for validating the state
transitions [50]. Secondly, the underlying consensus
mechanism should not lead to temporary forks, since
some of the TLS clients can verify an incorrect state
of a TLS certificate before the blocks have been
fully confirmed. Thirdly, the required time for the
confirmation of a new block in the consensus mechanism
should not be high, so that the transactions can change
the state of the TLS certificates in an acceptable
time frame. Finally, blockchain architecture should
enable TLS clients to verify the final state of the TLS
certificates and generate Merkle proofs efficiently. 3
In this respect, CertLedger can be deployed on
an existing blockchain architecture fulfilling these
requirements such as Ethereum [42], Neo [41] and
Ontology [52]. In these architectures, any consensus
mechanism can be selected which will not lead to
temporary forks such as PBFT [38] and DBFT [40].
3. CERTLEDGER
CertLedger is a PKI architecture to validate, store
and revoke TLS certificates and manage Trusted
CA certificates on a public blockchain. It aims to
make certificate issuance and revocation life cycle
more transparent and to eliminate any kinds of
MITM attacks. Moreover, it also aims to unify
certificate validation process for all TLS clients due
3State Merkle Patricia Trees are generally maintained to
generate proofs and track the final states of the assets efficiently.
The Merkle root of this tree is stored in the block headers, so that
the integrity of the tree, and the state proofs generated out of it
can be verified. [51]
to its inconsistent and inadequate implementations
throughout different TLS clients.
CertLedger manages the PKI functionalities through
state objects. A state object is a digital document which
is comprised of data and an immutable smart contract
code to manage it. Each state object has a unique
address in the blockchain. State changes of the assets
are triggered by transactions and tracked through the
state objects. CertLedger comprises the following state
objects.
• Domain State Object stores and manages the states
of all TLS certificates and their revocation status.
This state object comprise the necessary code
for validating the TLS certificate according to
international standards such as RFC 5280 [53]. It
uses the Trusted CAs State Object while building a
trusted path for the TLS certificate. Moreover, it
also comprises the necessary code for changing the
status of the TLS certificate as ’revoked’. Its smart
contract validates a TLS certificate while adding to
the CertLedger with following sample flow.
– Check whether the certificate has already
been added.
– Check whether the certificate is in its validity
period.
– Check whether the certificate is compliant to
the TLS certificate profile.
– Check whether the certificate is signed by one
of the CA certificates in Trusted CAs State
Object.
– Store the new TLS Certificate in the Domain
State Object and set its revocation status as
’Not Revoked’.
• Trusted CAs State Object stores the set of the
trusted CA certificates and smart contract code for
adding new CA certificates as ’trusted’ or changing
the status of the existing ones as ’untrusted’.
The smart contract code makes all the necessary
controls on the certificate and checks whether it
is complaint to international standart certificate
profiles (e.g. RFC 5280 [53]) for being a CA
certificate.
• An Account State Object stores the CertLedger
token balance of a CertLedger entity and is
controlled by the account’s private key(s). This
state object is used to create and trigger any
transaction within CertLedger.
• CertLedger Token State Object is the source of
the initial token supply. It comprises the smart
contract code to determine the initial owner of the
token supply, to transfer token between different
Account State Objects and to give permission to
a state object for transfering a certain amount of
token from a given Account State Object.
• Fraud Report State Object stores fraud reports
about the CAs which are in the Trusted CAs
State Object. The reports comprise proofs for
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the fraudulency of the CAs which but possibly
issued a valid but fake certificate. However, the
accused CAs can also add proofs about their
trustworthiness.
3.1. Entities
We have three types of entities in our model: 1)
CertLedger Entities (CertLedger Board, CertLedger
Foundation, CertLedger Clients ) 2) External Entities
(Certificate Authorities (CA), Domain Owners) 3)
Underlying Blockchain Entities (Miners, and Full
Nodes).
• A CA has basically four different tasks: 1) Checks
the identity of the Domain Owner for his TLS
certificate request. 2) Issues a TLS certificate
upon succesfull identity verification. 3) Optionally,
creates a transaction to append the issued
certificate to the CertLedger. 4) Optionally, creates
a transaction to change the revocation status of
the certificate in the CertLedger. Therefore, in
our model, CAs do not issue Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) and give OCSP service anymore.
• CertLedger Board is a trusted organization who
manages Trusted CAs State Object. It defines the
standards and procedures to manage this state
objects. In order to distribute the trust, private
key of its Account State Object is shared among the
CertLedger Board Members in a threshold fashion,
i.e., for n board members at most t of them are
assumed to be corrupted.
In order to provide transparency, the requirements
of being a board member should be defined as an
international standard by the organizations such
as IEEE [54], ISO [55] and IETF [56]. Certificate
Authorities, Browser and O/S Development Com-
panies(Foundations), Research Institutes, Univer-
sities and International Standardization Organiza-
tions (ETSI [57], ISO [55], IETF [56] etc.) are the
natural candidates of the CertLedger Board, but
any organization in the world fulling the require-
ments can be a board member.
• CertLedger Foundation promotes, supports and
develops CertLedger platform and does research
activities. They are also the owner of the initial
CertLedger token supply.
• A CertLedger Client is a light node(of the
underlying blockchain) which stores only the block
headers. It has connections with its peers according
to the underlying blockchain light client protocol.
It verifies the TLS certificates of the domains
through CertLedger.
• A Miner is a writer, a full node which selects
pending transactions from the pool, validates
them, and then creates new blocks according to
the consensus protocol. It generates blocks for all
the transactions of the underlying blockchain.
• A Full Node generates proof for the CertLedger
Clients to verify the final state of the state objects.
• A Domain Owner offers secure services to the
CertLedger Clients through protocols such as
https, imaps, and sips. He has the following
tasks: 1) Makes a TLS certificate request to
CAs for his domain. 2) Optionally, creates a
transaction to append the received TLS certificate
to the CertLedger. 3) Monitors his up-to-date
TLS certificate in the CertLedger (e.g., using event
watchers on Ethereum). 4) In case of compromise
detection, immediately creates a transaction to
revoke his TLS certificate and creates another
transaction to report the fraud.
3.2. Trust and Threat Model
3.2.1. Adversary Capabilities
Certificate Authorities (CA), CertLedger Clients, and
CertLedger Miners are assumed to be malicious which
can behave arbitrarily, e.g., fake but valid certificates
can be issued from the CAs which may be either
corrupted or operated with inadequate security policies.
Furthermore, for n CertLedger Board Members at most
t of them are assumed to be corrupted.
3.2.2. Assumptions
We first assume that the network underlying CertLedger
is insecure and a certain number of CertLedger Clients
are honest with respect to the underlying consensus
model for agreeing on the honest state of the blockchain.
Secondly, we assume that the underlying crypto-
graphic primitives and the blockchain architecture of
the CertLedger are secure.
3.3. PKI Functionalities of CertLedger
We now describe the functionalities of the CertLedger.
The responsibility of the entities in these stages are
illustrated in Figure 1.
• Adding a new Trusted CA Certificate:
CertLedger Board adds a CA certificate to the
Trusted CAs State Object as follows.
– Upon application of a CA, CertLedger Board
audits the CA and verifies whether it complies
with the Trusted CA standards.
– Upon a successful audit, they generate a
transaction comprising the CA certificate
which is signed in a threshold fashion to add
the CA certificate to the Trusted CAs State
Object.
– Smart contract code in the Trusted CAs
State Object verifies the signature of the
transaction, and makes all the necessary
checks on the CA Certificate.
– Upon successfull validation of the CA certifi-
cate it is added to the Trusted CAs State Ob-
ject as a trusted certificate.
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FIGURE 1: Functionalities of CertLedger
– Trusted CAs State Object triggers CertLedger
Token State Object to transfer the operation
fee from CA’s Account State Object to the
CertLedger Board ’s Account State Object.
• Changing Trust Status of a CA Certificate:
If a trusted CA fails to comply to Trusted CA
standards in further audits or its misbehavior is
proved through a fraud report, then the status of
its certificate is set as ’untrusted’ in the Trusted
CAs State Object as follows.
– CertLedger Board Members generate a trans-
action which is signed in a threshold fashion
to change the status of the CA certificate in
the Trusted CAs State Object.
– Smart contract code in the Trusted CAs
State Object verifies the signature of the
transaction, and checks whether the CA
certificate is unexpired and exists in the
Trusted CAs State Object.
– The state of the CA certificate is set as
’untrusted’ in the Trusted CAs State Object.
– Trusted CAs State Object triggers Domain
State Object to change the state of all TLS
certificates issued from this CA as ’revoked’.
– Trusted CAs State Object triggers CertLedger
Token State Object to transfer the operation
fee from CA’s Account State Object to the
CertLedger Board ’s Account State Object.
• Adding a new TLS certificate: As in the
conventional PKI architecture, upon application
of a Domain Owner, CA performs the relevant
verifications according to its policy and issues the
TLS certificate. Note that a Domain Owner can
have more than one valid TLS certificate of a
domain. In practice, before the expiration of his
TLS certificate, the Domain Owner receives a
new TLS certificate from the CA with overlapping
dates, so that the latter becomes active before the
expiration of the former.
Upon generation of a new TLS certificate, Domain
Owners and CAs add it to the Domain State Object
as follows.
– Domain Owner/CA creates a new transaction
comprising the new TLS certificate and signs
it using the private key of his own Account
State Object.
– Smart contract code in the Domain State
Object validates the certificate if the Domain
Owner/CA’s balance is sufficient for invoking
the transaction. Upon a successful validation,
the new TLS certificate is added to the
Domain State Object.
– Domain State Object triggers CertLedger To-
ken State Object to transfer the operation fee
from Domain Owner/CA’s Account State Ob-
ject to the CertLedger Foundation’s Account
State Object.
– Domain State Object triggers an event notifi-
cation after addition of the new certificate.
• Revocation of a TLS Certificate:
A TLS certificate is revoked in the CertLedger as
follows (Fig. ??):
– A valid revocation request can only be
generated for the non-expired and valid TLS
certificates. In our model, Domain Owners
and CAs are assumed to be the only parties
creating a valid revocation request. The
revocation request of a certificate comprises
a signature generated by either itself or by
its issuing CA’s certificate. The transaction
comprising the revocation request is signed by
the private key of the related entity’s Account
State Object.
– Smart contract code in the Domain State
Object validates the transaction if the
user’s balance is sufficient for invoking the
transaction. If the revocation code succeeds,
then the state of the certificate is changed as
’revoked’ in the Domain State Object.
– Domain State Object triggers CertLedger To-
ken State Object to transfer the operation fee
from Domain Owner/CA’s Account State Ob-
ject to the CertLedger Foundation’s Account
State Object.
– Domain State Object triggers an event
notification after revocation of the certificate.
• Reporting a Fraud: The fraud reports must also
be transparent, and should not be submitted and
The Computer Journal, Vol. ??, No. ??, ????
10 M. Y. Kubilay, M. S. Kiraz, and H. A. Mantar
processed in conventional mechanisms (e.g., email
or personal applications). If the Domain Owner
detects a fake but valid TLS certificate for his
domain in the CertLedger, he reports the fraud in
CertLedger as follows.
– Domain Owner generates a transaction
comprising the fake but valid TLS certificate
and a signature generated with his genuine
TLS certificate of the domain for proving his
ownership to the domain.
– He signs the transaction with the private key
of his Account State Object and triggers the
smart contract code of the Fraud Report State
Object.
– In the smart contract code, the existence of
the fake but valid TLS certificate in the Cer-
tLedger is verified, subject alternative names
in the genuine and the fake TLS certificates
are cross-checked, and the genuinity of the
TLS certificate used for generating the signa-
ture in the transaction is verified.
– If the contract code succeeds, the fraud report
is added to the Fraud Report State Object.
– The Fraud Report State Object triggers the
CertLedger Token State Object to transfer the
operation fee from Domain Owner ’s Account
State Object to the CertLedger Board ’s
Account State Object.
– Fraud Report State Object triggers an event
notification after adding the new fraud report.
• Pleading against a Fraud: CertLedger Board
and the Trusted CAs continually monitor the Fraud
Report State Object through event watchers. A
CA can plead in the CertLedger, when it catches a
notification triggered from the Fraud Report State
Object which comprises a fraud charge against it.
– Upon emergence of a new fraud report, it
immediately puts all the necessary documents
for the issuance of the TLS certificate to a
portal of the CertLedger Board.
– Generates a transaction comprising the hash
of these documents signed with its CA
certificate.
– Signs the transaction with the private key
of his Account State Object and triggers the
smart contract code of the Fraud Report State
Object.
– Smart contract code verifies whether the plea
is signed by the issuer of the fake TLS
certificate and the CA certificate exists in the
Trusted CAs State Object.
– The Fraud Report State Object triggers the
CertLedger Token State Object to transfer the
operation fee from Domain Owner ’s Account
State Object to the CertLedger Board ’s
Account State Object.
– Fraud Report State Object triggers an event
notification after adding the new fraud report.
– An event notification is triggered after adding
the new plea against the fraud.
Upon generation of the new block comprising this
transaction, CertLedger Board makes a decision
whether there exists a fraud. If the CertLedger
Board is not convinced by the plead, then it creates
a transaction to change the status of this CA
certificate as ’untrusted’.
• Transferring Token: Any entity having an
Account State Object can transfer token ownership.
While entities transfer token to be able to trigger
some of the functionalities of CertLedger, they
can also transfer token for only trading purposes.
Token ownership is transferred as follows.
– An entity creates a transaction comprising the
amount of the token to be transferred to a
recipient account and the destination Account
State Object address.
– He signs the transaction with the private key
of his Account State Object.
– The transaction triggers the CertLedger
Token State Object.
– Smart contract verifies the signature of the
transaction, and whether the balance of the
entity is sufficient to make the transfer, and
transfers the token from the sender’s account
to the recipient’s account.
• Searching TLS Certificate(s) of a Domain:
Any entity of the CertLedger can search the TLS
certificate(s) of a domain existing in the CertLedger
(possibly with some parameters) to check their
state. If the Domain Owner finds a fake but valid
TLS certificate, he immediately reports a fraud.
• Retrieving a State Proof of a TLS Certifi-
cate: CertLedger Clients and Domain Owners
query any of the Full Nodes to receive proof for
the existence and state of a TLS certificate. Full
Node returns the merkle proof generated out of the
state Merkle Tree.
• Verifying a State Proof of a TLS Certificate:
CertLedger Clients check whether the proof is
generated for the requested TLS certificate, and
verify it using the state Merkle Tree hash existing
in the related block header.
• Secure Communication through TLS: During
a TLS handshake, a CertLedger Client and a
domain agree upon the latest block number. The
domain sends the TLS certificate with its proof
(generated out of the State Merkle Tree for the
agreed block) to the CertLedger Client through
a TLS extension. The CertLedger Client checks
whether the TLS certificate is issued for the
domain, and is in its validity period. It verifies
the proof using the state tree hash which exists
in the agreed block header. It also checks whether
the proof is indeed generated for the certificate and
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FIGURE 2: TLS Connection within CertLedger
the state of the certificate is ’valid’. We highlight
here that CertLedger Clients do not require to
make further validation of the TLS certificate, since
this process is already completed while appending
certificate to the blockchain.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We next analyse the security, usability, and privacy
of CertLedger according to the following properties.
We also compare CertLedger with the existing pro-
posals from security and privacy perspective in Table 1.
Property 1: Under the assumptions of at most
t out of n board members are corrupted and the
underlying consensus protocol of the blockchain is
secure, CertLedger eliminates the split-world attacks.
Split-world attacks are only applicable if an attacker
can present different views of the logs to the targeted
victims. This can only exist when there is a trusted
log operator and targeted victims do not exchange
their view of the logs through gossip protocols.
CertLedger eliminates this attack since there is no
trusted log operator and all of the clients have the
same up-to-date log. Namely, there is only one
single log in the CertLedger which can be updated
only with the consensus of its clients. CertLedger ’s
trustworthiness is inherently based on its underlying
consensus mechanism. Since CertLedger Clients verify
the TLS certificate according to the view of the log
formed after either the latest fully confirmed block
or the latest block with respect to the underlying
consensus mechanism, CertLedger Clients are not
effected from the convergence of the ledger. Under the
assumption of the underlying consensus protocol of the
blockchain architecture is secure, all CertLedger Clients
will have the final state of the TLS certificates. They
are not subject to split-world attacks.
If more than t board members are corrupted, a
fraudulent CA can be added to the Trusted CAs State
Object. With a fake TLS certificate issued by this
CA, split-world attack cannot be performed only to a
selected set of victims. This is because the rest of the
TLS clients would not be able to verify the genuine
TLS certificate and make a successful TLS handshake.
Moreover, the fake certificate will be promptly de-
tected by the Domain Owners. Therefore, not only the
fraudulent CA, but also the fraudulent board members
would be responsible for this attack. Consequently,
the community lose trust to the CertLedger which re-
sults in either replacement of these board members or
creation a fork of CertLedger with a new set of board
members.
Property 2: Revocation process of CertLedger
reduces depency to CAs while making revocation status
of all the TLS certificates transparent.
In the CertLedger, revocation process is not totally
under the control of the CAs. A valid revocation
transaction will change the status of the certificate when
it is included in a new block. The security of revocation
transparency in CertLedger is analysed as follows:
• If the TLS certificate is not compromised, but
private key of the TLS certificate is unusable due
to forgotten password, lost or malformed private
key, then the issuing CA of the TLS certificate
can create a revocation transaction. However, in
this case revocation of the TLS certificate is not
necessary and if the private key exists, the Domain
Owner can simply destruct it.
• If the TLS certificate is compromised, and if the
Domain Owner can use the private key this TLS
certificate, he can create a revocation transaction
anytime without requiring the consent of the CA.
With a compromised valid TLS certificate, an ad-
versary can also create a revocation request for this
certificate. The adversary can have the following
motivations with a compromised valid TLS certifi-
cate. 1. To make impersonation/eavesdropping at-
tack, 2. To interrupt the service of the domain. If
the adversary has the first motivation, he does not
create a transaction to revoke the certificate. If his
motivation is the latter, then he creates a trans-
action to revoke the compromised TLS certificate
of the domain. However, as soon as the Domain
Owner becomes aware of the compromise, his ex-
pected behaviour would also be to revoke the com-
promised TLS certificate immediately and continue
the service using a different TLS certificate. Hence,
revocation of the compromised TLS certificate by
an adversary is not a vulnerability, but a prefered
behaviour by the Domain Owner.
If the Domain Owner cannot use the private key
of the compromised TLS certificate, he can not use
this TLS certificate to secure his service and has
to use a different TLS certificate of the domain.
However, if the compromised TLS certificate is not
revoked and the adversary has its private key, then
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TABLE 1: Security comparison of Log Based Approaches to Certificate Management
CT [22] AKI [27] ARPKI [28] DTKI [21] [32] CertLedger (This paper)
Resilient to split-world/MITM attack No No No No No Yes
Provides revocation transparency No Yes Yes Yes Partlya Yes
Eliminates client certificate validation process No No No No Partlyb Yes
Eliminates trusted key management No No No No No Yes
Preserves client privacy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Require external auditing Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Monitoring promptness No No No No c No d Yes
aRelies on CAs and the revocation process is not transparent
bRoot certificate validation is still necessary
cDo not make monitoring due to assuming all master certificates are genuine
dBlockchain architecture is inadequate
he can perform an impersonation attack if he can
also control the DNS servers. Consequently, in this
case, Domain Owner cannot create a transaction
for revocation of the TLS certificate and requests
it from the CA.
Hence, in CertLedger, CAs are not the only authority
who can revoke a certificate. The revocation process
can be triggered by also the Domain Owners. More-
over, the revocation status of all the TLS certificates is
transparent, can be tracked and verified in CertLedger.
Property 3: CertLedger eliminates certificate
revocation checking problems due to non-existent,
improper or malicious CRL/OCSP services offered by
the CAs.
CertLedger Clients do not need CAs to check the
revocation status of the TLS certificates. They receive
the final state of the TLS certificate with its proofs
from the domain during the TLS handshake. They can
verify the revocation status of the TLS certificate using
the state tree hash in the block headers. Thus, CRL
and OCSP services of the CAs are not needed to make
revocation check.
Property 4: CertLedger preserves the privacy of the
clients during TLS handshake.
While connecting to a domain during the TLS
handshake, the CertLedger Clients can check the
authenticity and the revocation status of a TLS certifi-
cate without requiring any further network connection,
hence their privacy is fully preserved.
Property 5: Trusted CA Management in Cer-
tLedger is transparent and can be publicly verified.
In CertLedger, the requirements of being a Trusted
CA is defined in the open standards. Only the CAs
complying these standards are accepted as a Trusted
CA upon inspection of the CertLedger Board Members.
The number of required Board Members for a valid
inspection is specified in a threshold manner. The
inspections are conducted periodically.
Fraudulence and malfunctioning reports about
Trusted CAs are also managed in the CertLedger. Any
CertLedger Client who has detected a fake but valid
TLS certificate, can put all the fraudulency proofs in
the CertLedger. The accused Trusted CA can also put
his justifications in the CertLedger. Upon inspection of
the proofs, CertLedger Board Members can change the
status of the Trusted CA as ’Untrusted’ in a threshold
manner.
Property 6: CertLedger eliminates Certificate/Key
Stores in TLS clients.
Management of Trusted CA root certificates and
public keys of logs is a burden and one of the main
source of security compromise [58,59]. At the moment,
TLS clients store them in their Certificate/Key Stores
which can be more than one with different contents for
a client. However, CertLedger Clients do not need to
manage the Trusted CA certificates and public keys
in a variety of Certificate/Key Stores. Namely, the
trustworthiness and the integrity of these certificates
and keys are assured by the blockchain architecture of
the CertLedger.
Property 7: CertLedger eliminates requirement for
external Log Auditors.
CertLedger do not require external auditing for
checking its cryptographic consistency and behaviour
since new blocks are verified and appended to the log
only upon the consensus of its clients.
Property 8: CertLedger provides only one single
implementation for certificate validation process.
Improper implementation of TLS certificate valida-
tion process by software vendors is one of the top ten
OWASP security vulnerabilities [60] in 2017. It is a
common issue with one internet crawler to be able to
connect to a TLS protected domain while encountering
connection problems with another crawler due to dif-
ferences in certificate validation processes. CertLedger
eliminates this issue by validating TLS certificates
prior to appending to the ledger according to the in-
ternational standards stated in Section 3.3. Therefore,
CertLedger Clients do not need to validate a TLS cer-
tificate during a TLS handshake, they only check its
existence and revocation status in the CertLedger.
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Property 9: CertLedger minimizes attack duration
due to instant monitoring.
CertLedger does not prevent issuance of fake but
valid TLS certificates and require monitoring. How-
ever, CertLedger provides infrastructure in order to
detect fake TLS certificates and fraudulent revoca-
tions instantly. Mechanisms such as event watchers
can be implemented which listen CertLedger events
and inform a Domain Owner through several means
(e.g., e-mail, SMS) upon a change on the state of his
TLS certificates. The events in smart contract based
blockchain architectures can easily be watched through
APIs such as web3 [?] for Ethereum. Therefore, in
CertLedger, monitoring process is effortless and the
attack duration can be minimized due to promptness.
5. PERFORMANCE OF CERTLEDGER
5.1. Storage
According to Verisign domain name industry brief,
there are about 3.3 × 108 registered domain names at
the end of 2017 [61] and approximately half of them
are using TLS certificates [62]. For the calculations
we consider the TLS certificates with elliptic curve
(EC) cryptography, since they will be dominantly used
across the internet due to smaller key sizes, higher
performance, and increased security. The size of a TLS
certificate which uses 256 bits of EC public key, signed
with ECDSA signature algorithm, is approximately 29
bytes.
The total disk space required to store all of the TLS
certificates is roughly about 1.65 × 108 × 29bytes ≈ 84
GB. The maximum life time period of TLS certificates
is specified as two years (825 days) in a recent CAB
Forum Ballot [63].
Note that the size of the underlying blockchain of the
CertLedger depends on its block size and the frequency
of adding new blocks. Block size increases with respect
to the number of comprised transactions and the target
block time depends on the selected consensus algorithm
of the CertLedger. (i.e., the target block time in Bitcoin
PoW consensus algorithm is a tradeoff between the
propagation time of the new blocks and the amount
of work wasted due to chain splits, and the target
block time in the Ouroboros algorithm is a simple
parameter that can be changed at any time according
to the network efficiency [45, 64]). While making the
calculations, for illustration purposes target block time
is selected as 10 minutes considering the following
aspects.
• The required storage capacity of the CertLedger
Clients will increase with shorter block times where
some of them have storage constraints and cannot
be upgraded easily.
• Selected block time should be discouraging for an
adversary to make an attack.
Moreover, we also estimate that the transactions
will be about mostly adding new certificates where
unnecessary revocations will be avoided due to the cost
of new TLS certificates. In this respect, storage space
requirements of a Full Node for keeping the transactions
of the CertLedger and CertLedger Client can be detailed
as follows:
• Full Nodes:
If we assume the average TLS certificate lifetime
will be one year, Full Nodes need approximately
84 GB of disk space per year for storing the TLS
certificates (i.e., total storage of miners= 84 GB ×
year). Considering the fact that the price of a 1 GB
disk storage is approximately 0.02 $ [65], the cost
of storing CertLedger transactions for a non-mining
full node is about 3.4 $, which is not a deterrent
amount.
These calculations are based on the assumption of
storing the certificates for all the TLS protected
domains. However, the required disk space can
be decreased during the initial phase of the
CertLedger by only adding the certificates of the
domains which have high risk for user privacy
and confidentiality (e.g., finance, social media,
shopping, mailing) and adding the rest in course
of time.
• CertLedger Clients: They do not store the
blocks but only the headers, and their required
disk space is directly proportional with the stored
number of blocks. As Satoshi describes in [29],
the required disk space to store block headers
in Bitcoin for 10 minutes block interval time is
4.2 MB (6 × 24 × 365 × 80 byte) per year. A
similar calculation for Ethereum with the same
block internal time results in 26 MB of disk space
per year. We expect CertLedger header size to be
similar to Ethereum. In this respect, for a two
years of period, light node CertLedger Clients will
require approximately 50 MB of disk space for all
TLS domains 4.
5.2. Communication
CertLedger full node clients do not need to make
network connection to verify a TLS certificate during
TLS handshake. However, due to underlying consensus
architecture, they need to exchange all the generated
transactions and the blocks with their peers in the P2P
network.
4There are also other studies proposed for efficient light node
clients in recent studies such as NIPoPoWs by IOHK [66] and
FlyClient by Luu et al. [67]. For instance, FlyClient proposes,
not only storing previous blocks hash in block headers, but also
the root of a merkle tree which commits to all blocks. Therefore, a
logarithmic sized proof will be enough to verify whether a specific
block is a part of the blockchain. Consequently, it is sufficient for
the light nodes to store the head of the chain. They only require
another Merkle proof to verify whether a transaction is included
in the block.
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CertLedger light node clients need to receive the
final state of the Domain State Object and the related
Merkle proofs for the state tree in TLS extensions
from the domain during the TLS connection. These
extensions will bring an overhead to the communication
between the client and the domain. As a part of the
P2P network, they only download block headers from
the P2P network, but do not exchange blocks and
transactions with other peers as the light nodes in other
blockchain architectures such as Bitcoin and Ethereum.
5.3. Computation
Lookup, insertion, and update operations depend on
the data structures used in the CertLedger. Since
CertLedger Clients requires to verify the final state
of the TLS certificates efficiently, CertLedger can use
modified Patricia trees as in Ethereum in order to
process the aforementioned operations in O(log(n))
where n denotes the number of TLS certificates [68].
6. COMPARISON
We now compare the CertLedger with the previous
proposals according to following criterias which is
tabulated in Table 2.
Log Proofs: CertLedger provides proof for the
existence and revocation status for all the TLS
certificates as DTKI. CT provides proof only for the
existence of a certificate in the log whereas AKI
and ARPKI provide proofs only for the valid TLS
certificates which are not revoked and expired. [32]
provides existence proof for all of the TLS certificates,
but may not provide a revocation proof if a CA does
not issue correct CRL or gives OCSP service.
TLS Handshake Performance: In CT, the proofs
are sent to the clients during TLS handshake. However,
the received proof is not enough to make a successful
TLS handshake since TLS clients have to check the
revocation status of the TLS certificate by conventional
methods like CRL or OCSP which can be cumbersome
due to big CRL files and latency or interruption in
OCSP services. Moreover, if the TLS clients make a
prior audit to the logs to check the existence of the
proofs, handshake duration increases. In DTKI, TLS
clients have to make network connections to both MLM
and the CLM to request the proofs. In [32], web servers
send the certificate transactions and the Merkle proofs
in TLS extensions to the browsers, and the browsers
validate the transactions using the block headers. In
addition, browsers with high security concerns may also
spend time for revocation checking with conventional
methods.
Full node CertLedger Clients do not require any
external proofs for a successful TLS handshake and can
check the existence and the revocation status of a TLS
certificate locally, but light node clients have to receive
and verify the final state of the TLS certificate and the
related Merkle Audit Proof from the domain.
Independent Logs: In CT, AKI and ARPKI, there
can be independent logs which comprise different sets
of TLS certificates. If a TLS client is trusting to a log
and the visited domain’s TLS certificate has not been
appended to the log, then the TLS connection will be
unsuccessful. For the CAs and the domain owners, it
is impossible to know the TLS clients’ set of trusted
logs. Hence, ideally, CAs have to append their TLS
certificates to all of the independent logs to eliminate
the unsuccessful TLS connections. But the set of logs
is not fixed and new logs can arise anytime. Appending
TLS certificates to a changing set of logs is a burden
for the CAs. Moreover, necessity of monitoring and
auditing different logs is another overhead which can
also lead to security compromise.
However, in CertLedger, all of the TLS certificates
are appended to one single log with multiple copies,
and CertLedger Clients do not need a trusted key for
the verification of the log proofs. Only this single log
have to be monitored.
Log Availability: In CT, logs have to be audited
and monitored continually for consistency and finding
fake TLS certificates.
In A(RP)KI, after each ILS update or a time out
period, domain owners need to download proofs from
the ILS. In DTKI, clients have to request proofs from
the MLM, CLM or their mirrors during each TLS
connection. Due to these reasons, all of these proposals
require the logs to be permanently available which may
lead to a single point of failure. However, CertLedger
is maintained in a P2P network upon consensus of its
clients. Every full node CertLedger Client have a copy
of the log and do not have a dependency to verify
the TLS certificates. The light node clients receive
the Domain State Object of the TLS certificate and
its merkle proofs from the domain and verify it locally
using block headers.
Auditing and Monitoring: CT requires to be
audited by external auditors such as TLS clients and
monitored by the CAs and the domain owners. In
AKI, there are Validators which check the consistency
of ILS s and whether the TLS certificates are updated
according to certificate policies. In ARPKI, Validators
are optional and their role is distributed to other CAs
or ILS s. DTKI relies on TLS clients for auditing, but
do not require monitoring due to existence of master
certificates. Expiration of master certificates and
issuance of fake master certificates by the compromised
CAs are open issues in DTKI both related to
monitoring. [32] does not require external auditing,
however it does not propose an efficient monitoring
architecture.
As already discussed in Section 4, CertLedger does
not require external auditing, and can be monitored
easily and promptly.
Key/Certificate Store Management: In CT,
TLS clients have to store Trusted CA certificates
and the public keys of the logs to validate the TLS
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TABLE 2: Comparison of Log Based Approaches to Certificate Management
CT [22] AKI [27] ARPKI [28] DTKI [21] [32] CertLedger (This paper)
External Dependency During
TLS Handshake
Yes Yes Yesa Yes No No
Factors Effecting
TLS Handshake Performance
Certificate and proof
verification,
Revocation checking,
Auditing (optional)
Certificate and proof
verification,
Occasional checks
for the ILS root
hash with the
Validators
Certificate and proof
verification
Certificate and proof
verification,
Connection to
MLM and CLM
Blockchain update,
Verification of the
transaction and
the proof
Data transmission
overhead and
verification of the
Merkle audit proof
Existence of Logs with
Different Contents
Yes Yes Yes No No No
Necessity of External
Auditing
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Necessity of External
Monitoring
Yes Yes Yes No b Yes Yesc
Does TLS Clients Require
to Store Trusted Keys
or Certificates of Logs ?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
TLS Clients Requires to Store
a copy of the Log
No No No No Partly (block headers) Partly (block headers)
aClients have to make standard certificate validation which may require external resources
bMakes an unrealistic assumption that fake Master certificates cannot be issued, apparently not relevant for strong adversaries
cMonitoring is efficient, it is possible to be aware of the TLS certificate state change promptly
certificates and the SCT s. Although, AKI states
that installing the trusted CAs and ILS s certificates
and public keys to TLS clients will be enough to
make a successful TLS connection, TLS clients also
receive signed validator information from the domains
during the TLS handshake. In order to validate this
information, clients must also trust the Validators’
public keys. In ARPKI, TLS clients have to store
the trusted CAs and ILS s certificates to validate the
proofs received from the domain. In DTKI, TLS clients
require only the MLM public key to verify the queried
proofs during a TLS connection. [32] clients continue
to make the conventional trusted key/certificate store
management.
However, Trusted CA certificates are stored and
managed in CertLedger. While adding TLS certificates
to the CertLedger, they are verified whether they are
issued by one of the Trusted CAs. Since CertLedger
Clients do not make further verification, but only check
the revocation status of the TLS certificate during TLS
handshake, they do not require to store and manage
any trusted key or certificate.
Privacy: In CT, TLS clients audit the log to ensure
its consistency by requesting Merkle Audit Proof s for
the SCT they have received from the domains during
the TLS connection. Moreover, they can use OCSP to
check the revocation status of a TLS certificate. These
processes enables logs and the OCSP servers, to trace
the browsing history of the TLS clients. In AKI and
ARPKI, domains send the proofs to the TLS clients,
thus their privacy is preserved. In DTKI, TLS clients
both query MLM and the CLM to receive proofs for the
targeted domain during TLS handshake. It is proposed
that, to preserve privacy, the domains can act as a proxy
to make these queries. However, this proposal will
increase the network latency even more in DTKI. TLS
clients in [32] continue to make conventional revocation
checking, hence their browsing history can be traced by
the OCSP servers.
In CertLedger, as discussed in Section 4, privacy of
the clients are fully preserved.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
There have been serious security incidents due to
corrupted CAs which issued fake but valid TLS
certificates. To make CAs more transparent and to
verify their operations, public logs are proposed in
recent studies such as CT, AKI, ARPKI and DTKI.
CT is proposed by Google which has almost half of the
browser market share. Google made CT mandatory
in Chrome for all issued TLS certificates after April
2018 [69]. However, CT and the other proposals are
subject to split-world attacks.
We propose a new PKI model with certificate
transparency based on blockchain, what we called
CertLedger. In the CertLedger all TLS clients can
verify the final state of log, which makes split-world
attack impossible. Moreover, CertLedger also provides
transparency in certificate revocation and trusted CA
management processes.
A future work would be implementing CertLedger in
an existing blockchain framework (e.g., Ethereum or
Neo) and make a detailed performance and usability
analysis. Moreover, in order to eliminate the CertLedger
Board Members, introducing an automated mechanism
running without human intervention will increase the
transparency of the trusted CA management.
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